Costly Signalling in Auctions
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Publication:5293371
Recommendations
Cited in
(12)- Bidding frictions in ascending auctions
- A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels
- A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation
- Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
- A theory of costly sequential bidding
- Compulsory license threats in a signaling game of drug procurement
- Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions
- On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
- Creating a winner's curse via jump bids
- The sunk-cost fallacy in penny auctions
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