Costly Signalling in Auctions

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2007.00418.XMaRDI QIDQ5293371zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Johannes Hörner, Nicolas Sahuguet

Publication date 2 July 2007

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• A theory of costly sequential bidding
• Creating a winner's curse via jump bids
• Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions

Cited in

(12)

• Bidding frictions in ascending auctions
• A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels
• A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation
• Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
• A theory of costly sequential bidding
• Compulsory license threats in a signaling game of drug procurement
• Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions
• On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
• Creating a winner's curse via jump bids
• The sunk-cost fallacy in penny auctions

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