Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01518-9MaRDI QIDQ6579445zbMATHzbMATHFDO

Authors Jeongwoo Lee, Jaeok Park

Publication date 25 July 2024

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

signalingparticipation costssequential auctionsentry deterrencepreemptive entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
• Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
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• Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 93751 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders
• Convergence-preserving function sequences and uniform convergence
• Costly Signalling in Auctions
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
• Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
• Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions

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