Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01518-9zbMATH Open1546.9114MaRDI QIDQ6579445FDOQ6579445

Authors: Jeongwoo Lee, Jaeok Park 

Publication date: 25 July 2024

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

signalingparticipation costssequential auctionsentry deterrencepreemptive entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
• Costly Signalling in Auctions
• A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders
• On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
• Convergence-preserving function sequences and uniform convergence
• I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions

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