A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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Publication:3948830
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- QUANTUM AUCTIONS
- Optimal constrained bidding
- Vickrey auctions in the theory of expected utility with rank-dependent probabilities
- Limited liability and high bids in English auctions
- Auctions with entry and resale
- Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Infinite and Giant Components in the Layers Percolation Model
- Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis
- Adversarial risk analysis: an overview
- Randomization, endogeneity and laboratory experiments: the role of cash balances in private value auctions
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
- The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral \(k\)-double auctions
- Non-existence of subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon
- Comparative ross risk aversion in the presence of mean dependent risks
- The expected payoff to Internet auctions
- Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
- Ordering sellers in sequential auctions
- Pivot mechanisms as a link between probability and preference revelation
- Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
- Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Dependence and uniqueness in Bayesian games
- Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
- English auctions with resale: an experimental study
- Vertically differentiated simultaneous Vickrey auctions: theory and experimental evidence
- Unraveling in first-price auction.
- Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
- A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
- Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Near-optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions
- On the cost of misperception: general results and behavioral applications
- Mid-auction information acquisition
- Optimal design of online sequential buy-price auctions with consumer valuation learning
- Auction-based distributed scheduling in a dynamic job shop environment
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals
- Testing affiliation in private-values models of first-price auctions using grid distributions
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information
- Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
- Procurement bidding in first-price and second-price, sealed-bid auctions within the common-value paradigm
- Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
- Increasing threshold search for best-valued agents
- Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers
- Auctions with a buy price
- Credit auctions and bid caps
- Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition
- Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels
- Search by committee
- Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
- A Bayesian equilibrium for simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods and quasi-linear bids
- A consistent nonparametric test of affiliation in auction models
- Reputational bidding
- Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property
- Dynamic Auctions
- Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
- The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
- Auction timing and market thickness
- Optimal auctions revisited
- Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders
- Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
- Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions
- A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline
- An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values
- Auctions with flexible entry fees: a note
- Non-parametric estimation of sequential English auctions
- On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- A determination of bid rents through bidding procedures
- Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding
- Auctions with entry
- Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders
- Positive Dependence and Weak Convergence
- Information disclosure and pricing policies for sales of network goods
- Game-theoretic modeling of players' ambiguities on external factors
- An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner
- The timing of bid placement and extent of multiple bidding: an empirical investigation using ebay online auctions
- Multiagent system simulations of signal averaging in English auctions with two-dimensional value signals
- What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
- Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction
- Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
- Equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem
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