A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- Auctions with a buy price
- Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
- Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
- Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
- Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
- Multiagent system simulations of signal averaging in English auctions with two-dimensional value signals
- Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions
- Star-shaped probability weighting functions and overbidding in first-price auctions
- Multiple bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations
- Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
- Risky procurement with an insider bidder
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Optimal constrained bidding
- Pivot mechanisms as a link between probability and preference revelation
- Search mechanisms
- Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
- On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions
- Advantageous multiple rent seeking
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
- Speculation and price fluctuations with private, extrinsic signals
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Stochastic dominance under Bayesian learning
- A dominant strategy double auction
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Investment decisions under first and second price auctions
- Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners
- On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
- A learning approach to auctions
- The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
- Comparative statics in first price auctions
- Hypothetical--actual bid calibration of a multigood auction
- The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding
- Auctions with endogenous valuations: The snowball effect revisited
- Auctions of heterogeneous objects
- Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands
- Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
- An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information
- Sequential auctions with delay costs. A two-period model
- Second price auctions without expected utility
- Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
- On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions
- A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
- Strategic behavior in dynamic auctions
- Price competition for an informed buyer
- Sequentially optimal auctions
- Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- Unraveling in first-price auction.
- On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Mean sample spacings, sample size and variability in an auction-theoretic framework.
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Fuzzy formulation of auctions and optimal sequencing for multiple auctions.
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
- Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions
- Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
- A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
- Optimal bidding and contracting strategies for capital-intensive goods
- Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
- Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk
- Procurement bidding in first-price and second-price, sealed-bid auctions within the common-value paradigm
- Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- On the cost of misperception: general results and behavioral applications
- Mid-auction information acquisition
- Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
- Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers
- The loser's bliss in auctions with price externality
- Two ways to auction off an uncertain good
- Bidding behavior in experimental auctions with positive and negative values
- Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
- Identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand
- Rationalization and identification of binary games with correlated types
- The discrete bid first auction
- Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders
- Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- Near-optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions
- Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders
- Credit auctions and bid caps
- Game-theoretic modeling of players' ambiguities on external factors
- Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options
- An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner
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