A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

DOI10.2307/1911865zbMATH Open0487.90017OpenAlexW1494498837WikidataQ30050221 ScholiaQ30050221MaRDI QIDQ3948830FDOQ3948830

Authors: Paul R. Milgrom, Robert J. Weber 

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/447.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

first-price auctionssecond-price auctioncompetitive biddingEnglish ascending auctionpreference dependent payofftheory of auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• Effects of competition in first-price auctions
• Vickrey auctions in the theory of expected utility with rank-dependent probabilities
• Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
• On the cost of misperception: general results and behavioral applications
• Mid-auction information acquisition
• Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
• Optimal auctions revisited
• Reputational bidding
• Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
• The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
• Multiagent system simulations of signal averaging in English auctions with two-dimensional value signals
• Comparing the Spanish and the discriminatory auction formats: a discrete model with private information
• A law of large numbers for weighted majority
• A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders
• \(k\)-price auctions: revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design
• Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk
• Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
• On the nature of certainty equivalent functionals
• On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in \((k+1)\)-st price common value auctions
• On the sub-optimality of entry fees in auctions with entry
• The formal-CAFE methodology and model checking patterns in the specification of e-commerce systems
• Competing first-price and second-price auctions
• Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
• Verifiable disclosure
• Investment decisions under first and second price auctions
• Price competition for an informed buyer
• Auctions of heterogeneous objects
• On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
• A note on discrete bid first-price auction with general value distribution
• On inequalities for moments and the covariance of monotone functions
• Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly
• Mean sample spacings, sample size and variability in an auction-theoretic framework.
• Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
• Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
• The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
• Reserve price commitments in auctions
• Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
• Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games
• A model of rational competitive bidding
• On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
• The Price of Anarchy in Auctions
• Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
• Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
• Bidding behavior in experimental auctions with positive and negative values
• A probability model for strategic bidding on ``The price is right
• A simple nonparametric test for synergies in multi-object sequential English auctions
• First-price auctions without affiliation
• Quantile regression methods for first-price auctions
• Value-rationalizability in auction bidding
• On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
• Learning to bid in sequential Dutch auctions
• Markets versus negotiations: an experimental investigation
• The Herodotus paradox
• Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
• A parametrization of the auction design space
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation
• Performance evaluation of multi-object auctions
• When and why not to auction
• The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral \(k\)-double auctions
• Comparative ross risk aversion in the presence of mean dependent risks
• The expected payoff to Internet auctions
• Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options
• Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
• English auctions with resale: an experimental study
• Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals
• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Testing affiliation in private-values models of first-price auctions using grid distributions
• A Bayesian equilibrium for simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods and quasi-linear bids
• Auctions with a buy price
• A consistent nonparametric test of affiliation in auction models
• An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values
• Auctions with flexible entry fees: a note
• Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics
• Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
• Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
• Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test
• Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders
• Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
• Updating toward the signal
• On optimal bidding in sequential procurement auctions
• Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: theory and experimental evidence
• On efficiency of the English auction
• Auctions with online supply
• Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
• Combating online in-auction fraud: clues, techniques and challenges
• Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects
• Auctions with endogenous entry
• Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
• Corrigendum to ``Reserve price signaling
• Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
• How to translate results from auctions to procurements
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions
• A weighted product method for bidding strategies in multi-attribute auctions

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