A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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Publication:3948830
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Randomization tests of copula symmetry
- Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions
- Common-value auctions with discrete private information
- A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands
- Bidding under price uncertainty in multi-unit pay-as-bid procurement auctions for power systems reserve
- Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders
- Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
- Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Semiparametric estimation in models of first-price, sealed-bid auctions with affiliation
- Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Advertising a second-price auction
- Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
- Evolutionary dynamics of biological auctions
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Optimal risk sharing with background risk
- Weak and strong monotone comparative statics
- Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions
- A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline
- Semiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object, English auctions
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
- Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function
- Fear of ruin
- Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
- Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
- Non-parametric estimation of sequential English auctions
- Non-existence of subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
- Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
- QUANTUM AUCTIONS
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
- Optimal bidding and contracting strategies for capital-intensive goods
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions
- Declining prices in sequential auctions with complete revelation of bids
- Some notions of multivariate positive dependence
- On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games
- A dominant strategy double auction
- Increasing interdependence of multivariate distributions
- Spite and reciprocity in auctions
- Star-shaped probability weighting functions and overbidding in first-price auctions
- Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
- Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- The theory of contests: a survey
- Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders
- Auctions with financial externalities
- Auctions with entry
- A note on expected rent in auction theory
- Reserve price signaling
- A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
- Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- On bidding with securities: risk aversion and positive dependence
- Cross-owned firms competing in auctions
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- The timing of bid placement and extent of multiple bidding: an empirical investigation using ebay online auctions
- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
- Positive Dependence and Weak Convergence
- Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
- Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
- Randomization, endogeneity and laboratory experiments: the role of cash balances in private value auctions
- Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
- Information revelation in auctions
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
- Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
- On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
- All-pay auctions with pre- and post-bidding options
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
- Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information
- Multiagent system simulations of signal averaging in English auctions with two-dimensional value signals
- Optimal auctions revisited
- Price competition for an informed buyer
- Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
- Reputational bidding
- Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
- A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders
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