A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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Publication:3948830
DOI10.2307/1911865zbMath0487.90017OpenAlexW1494498837WikidataQ30050221 ScholiaQ30050221MaRDI QIDQ3948830
Paul R. Milgrom, Robert J. Weber
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/447.pdf
first-price auctionssecond-price auctioncompetitive biddingEnglish ascending auctionpreference dependent payofftheory of auctions
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