Dual sourcing with price discovery

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.007zbMath1411.91251OpenAlexW3122542325WikidataQ128133772 ScholiaQ128133772MaRDI QIDQ2416645

Matthias Dahm, José Alcalde

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/90429

zbMATH Keywords

contestsprice discoverydual sourcingprocurement auctionstwo-stage game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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