Dual sourcing with price discovery

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.03.007zbMATH Open1411.91251OpenAlexW3122542325WikidataQ128133772 ScholiaQ128133772MaRDI QIDQ2416645FDOQ2416645

Matthias Dahm, José Alcalde

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/90429

Recommendations

• Price discovery using a double auction
• Dual Sourcing in Repeated Procurement Competitions
• Dual sourcing: responsive hedging against correlated supply and demand uncertainty
• Note: Dual sourcing with nonidentical suppliers
• Dual-source procurement and supplier pricing decision under supply interruption
• Dynamic pricing in a dual-market environment
• A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
• Dual-role based pricing in a dynamic and competitive environment
• Pricing and supply priority in a dual-channel supply chain
• Dual sourcing under disruption risk and cost improvement through learning

zbMATH Keywords

contestsdual sourcingprice discoveryprocurement auctionstwo-stage game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Coordination in Split Award Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
• Multiple Sourcing and Procurement Process Selection with Bidding Events
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
• Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity
• Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Auctions of Shares
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
• Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
• Competition for procurement shares
• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
• A simple result for the revenue in share auctions.
• Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• Bidding for Contests
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Price Discovery across the Rhine *

This page was built for publication: Dual sourcing with price discovery

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2416645)