Competition for procurement shares

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.03.007MaRDI QIDQ2435901zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm

Publication date 21 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://web.ua.es/es/dmcte/documentos/qmetwp1103.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

affirmative actionprocurement auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
• SMEs and public procurement policy
• Probabilistic procurement auctions
• Optimal Procurement Mechanisms
• Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: theory and data

Cites work

• Asymmetric Auctions
• Auctions of Shares
• Competition for procurement shares
• Coordination in Split Award Auctions
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity
• Is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly?
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
• On the complete information first-price auction and its intuitive solution
• Optimal Auction Design
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: theory and data
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds

Cited in

(20)

• Government procurement and asymmetric rebate auctions
• Discriminatory procurement policy with cash limits
• SMEs and public procurement policy
• Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement.
• Block sourcing plus
• Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
• Dual sourcing with price discovery
• Competition for procurement shares
• Similar bidders in takeover contests
• Quality cut-offs in procurement auctions
• An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars
• Is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly?
• Competition for Procurement Contracts and Underinvestment
• Procurement mechanisms for assortments of differentiated products
• Winning by default: why is there so little competition in government procurement?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5197117 (Why is no real title available?)
• Rent seeking in public procurement
• To discriminate or not to discriminate: how to enforce unverifiable quality in repeated procurement
• Bid coordination in split-award procurement: the buyer need not know anything
• When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions

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