Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds

DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0031-6zbMath1274.91020MaRDI QIDQ2462901

Matthias Dahm, José Alcalde

Publication date: 5 December 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0031-6

zbMATH Keywords

cap; rent dissipation; all-pay auction; contest success function; rent-seeking; exclusion principle; campaign contributions; (non-)deterministic contest; preemption effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Backscattering of Continuous and Pulsed Beams, Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules, Success in contests, Foundations for contest success functions, Relative difference contest success function, Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction, Competition for procurement shares, The theory of contests: a survey

Cites Work

• Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
• Contest success functions
• Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Serial Cost Sharing
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case