Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds
DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0031-6zbMATH Open1274.91020OpenAlexW2016550680MaRDI QIDQ2462901FDOQ2462901
Authors: José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm 
Publication date: 5 December 2007
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0031-6
Recommendations
capall-pay auctioncontest success functionrent-seekingrent dissipationexclusion principlecampaign contributions(non-)deterministic contestpreemption effect
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)
Cites Work
- New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
- Serial Cost Sharing
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
- Contest success functions
- Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
- Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions
Cited In (11)
- Backscattering of continuous and pulsed beams
- Lov\'asz Meets Weisfeiler and Leman
- Large Tullock contests
- Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
- Success in contests
- The theory of contests: a survey
- Foundations for contest success functions
- Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules
- Relative difference contest success function
- Competition for procurement shares
- Moser and tardos meet Lovász
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