Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds

DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0031-6zbMath1274.91020OpenAlexW2016550680MaRDI QIDQ2462901

Matthias Dahm, José Alcalde

Publication date: 5 December 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0031-6

zbMATH Keywords

caprent dissipationall-pay auctioncontest success functionrent-seekingexclusion principlecampaign contributions(non-)deterministic contestpreemption effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Success in contests ⋮ Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules ⋮ Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction ⋮ Backscattering of Continuous and Pulsed Beams ⋮ Competition for procurement shares ⋮ The theory of contests: a survey ⋮ Foundations for contest success functions ⋮ Relative difference contest success function

Cites Work

• Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
• Contest success functions
• Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Serial Cost Sharing
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case

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