Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- Contest success functions
- Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
- Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions
- New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules
- Serial Cost Sharing
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
Cited in
(14)- Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules
- Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
- Success in contests
- Foundations for contest success functions
- Relative difference contest success function
- Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
- Competition for procurement shares
- The theory of contests: a survey
- Backscattering of continuous and pulsed beams
- Lov\'asz Meets Weisfeiler and Leman
- Moser and tardos meet Lovász
- Large Tullock contests
- Overconfidence and strategic behavior in elimination contests: implications for CEO selection
- The power of passivity in the Hirshleifer contest under small noise
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