Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions

DOI10.1007/s00199-004-0554-9zbMath1094.91013OpenAlexW1999411617MaRDI QIDQ818522

David A. Malueg, Andrew J. Yates

Publication date: 21 March 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0554-9

zbMATH Keywords

pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Group contest success functions ⋮ Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules ⋮ Optimal tie-breaking rules ⋮ Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation ⋮ Contests with an uncertain number of prizes with a fixed total value ⋮ The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation ⋮ Resource allocations in the best-of-\(k\) (\(k=2, 3\)) contests ⋮ Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions ⋮ Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach ⋮ On the optimal allocation of prizes in best-of-three all-pay auctions ⋮ Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds ⋮ Relative difference contest success function

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