Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0554-9MaRDI QIDQ818522zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David A. Malueg, Andrew J. Yates

Publication date 21 March 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0554-9

zbMATH Keywords

pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

The authors consider symmetric rent-seeking contests and assume that the contest success function satisfies a natural collection of properties, including homogeneity of degree zero. In these conditions they prove that if a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists, then this equilibrium is unique. Moreover, a sufficient condition for the existence of such equilibrium is obtained. Finally, the authors consider two specific contest success functions taken from the literature. In both cases the required properties are satisfied and the results provided are used to look for symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

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Cited in

(21)

• Advantageous multiple rent seeking
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• The specification of the probability functions in Tullock's rent-seeking contest
• Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules
• Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: uniqueness and characterization
• Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
• The dynamic rent-seeking games with policymaker cost and competition intensity
• On the optimal allocation of prizes in best-of-three all-pay auctions
• Relative difference contest success function
• Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds
• Contests with an uncertain number of prizes with a fixed total value
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• On the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric public-good contests
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2202838 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal tie-breaking rules
• Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation
• The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation
• Resource allocations in the best-of-\(k\) (\(k=2, 3\)) contests
• Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions
• When less is more: rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests
• Group contest success functions

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