When less is more: rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.008zbMath1278.91038OpenAlexW2249756588MaRDI QIDQ665087

Luca Stanca, Marco Faravelli

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentsrent seekingstochastic contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

Cooperation and distributive conflict ⋮ Framing and repeated competition ⋮ That's the ticket: explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Endogenous entry in contests
• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test
• Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
• Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
• The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
• Coordination and information: Recent experimental evidence

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