When less is more: rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.008MaRDI QIDQ665087zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marco Faravelli, Luca Stanca

Publication date 5 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentsrent seekingstochastic contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests
• A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests
• Complete rent dissipation when the number of rent seekers is uncertain
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• A theory of sticky rents: search and bargaining with incomplete information
• The dynamic rent-seeking games with policymaker cost and competition intensity
• Equilibria in rent-seeking contests with homogeneous success functions
• On the theory of effective demand under stochastic rationing
• Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules
• Rationing, bargaining, and voting in 2-sided markets

Cites work

• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• Coordination and information: Recent experimental evidence
• Endogenous entry in contests
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Financing public goods by means of lotteries.
• Funding public goods with lotteries: experimental evidence.
• Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
• Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
• The all-pay auction with complete information

Cited in

(8)

• Framing and repeated competition
• That's the ticket: explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests
• When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
• Regulation through a revenue contest
• Complete rent dissipation when the number of rent seekers is uncertain
• A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests
• Cooperation and distributive conflict
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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