When less is more: rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests
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Publication:665087
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.05.008zbMATH Open1278.91038OpenAlexW2249756588MaRDI QIDQ665087FDOQ665087
Authors: Marco Faravelli, Luca Stanca 
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.008
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Cites Work
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
- The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
- Financing public goods by means of lotteries.
- Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
- Coordination and information: Recent experimental evidence
- Funding public goods with lotteries: experimental evidence.
- Contests with a stochastic number of players
- Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test
- Endogenous entry in contests
Cited In (8)
- Framing and repeated competition
- That's the ticket: explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests
- When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
- Regulation through a revenue contest
- Complete rent dissipation when the number of rent seekers is uncertain
- A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests
- Cooperation and distributive conflict
- Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
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