Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test

DOI10.1007/S10683-006-9133-1MaRDI QIDQ2642610zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David S. Bullock, E. Elisabet Rutström

Publication date 17 August 2007

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1

zbMATH Keywords

Experimental economicsRent-dissipationRent-seekingTransfers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Reciprocal rent-seeking contests
• Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation
• Extreme parties and political rents
• Forms of governance and the size of rent-seeking
• Complete rent dissipation when the number of rent seekers is uncertain

Cites work

• A model of noisy introspection.
• An analysis of variance test for normality (complete samples)
• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45877 (Why is no real title available?)
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games

Cited in

(4)

• Transfers or public good provision? A political allocation perspective
• Forms of governance and the size of rent-seeking
• Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation
• When less is more: rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Gambit

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