Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation

DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9454-zzbMath1377.91012OpenAlexW2095385040MaRDI QIDQ497475

Gil S. Epstein, Yosef Mealem

Publication date: 24 September 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9454-z

zbMATH Keywords

rent dissipationall-pay auctioncontestcentral plannergeneralized logit contest success function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Group contest success functions
• The politics of randomness
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• Contest success functions
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
• Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Contest architecture
• Political culture and monopoly price determination
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

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