Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation

DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9454-ZMaRDI QIDQ497475zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gil S. Epstein, Yosef Mealem

Publication date 24 September 2015

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9454-z

zbMATH Keywords

contestall-pay auctioncentral plannergeneralized logit contest success functionrent dissipation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test
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Cites work

• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• Contest architecture
• Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization
• Contest success functions
• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Group contest success functions
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Political culture and monopoly price determination
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The politics of randomness
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.

Cited in

(1)

• Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test

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