Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation
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Publication:497475
DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9454-ZzbMATH Open1377.91012OpenAlexW2095385040MaRDI QIDQ497475FDOQ497475
Authors: Gil S. Epstein, Yosef Mealem 
Publication date: 24 September 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9454-z
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)
Cites Work
- Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
- Contest architecture
- Strategy and dynamics in contests
- Contest success functions
- Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
- The politics of randomness
- The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
- Group contest success functions
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- Foundations for contest success functions
- Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization
- Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
- Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
- Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
- Contests with endogenous discrimination
- Political culture and monopoly price determination
- Discrimination in contests: a survey
Cited In (1)
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