Contest architecture
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2490123
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.004zbMath1108.91008OpenAlexW4230999097MaRDI QIDQ2490123
Publication date: 28 April 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.004
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (71)
Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps ⋮ A contest success function for rankings ⋮ Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. A mechanism design approach ⋮ Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction ⋮ Effective contests ⋮ Simple equilibria in general contests ⋮ Revenue in contests with many participants ⋮ Population uncertainty and revealing contestants ⋮ Optimal lobbying pricing ⋮ Information feedback in a dynamic tournament ⋮ Incentives versus competitive balance ⋮ Innovation contests with risk‐averse participants ⋮ Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information ⋮ Assortative matching by lottery contests ⋮ Two-stage elimination games ⋮ Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests ⋮ Ability grouping in contests ⋮ Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments ⋮ Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis ⋮ All-pay matching contests ⋮ The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes ⋮ Optimal seedings in interdependent contests ⋮ Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes ⋮ Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs ⋮ Optimal sequential contests ⋮ Single- and double-elimination tournaments under psychological momentum ⋮ Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs ⋮ Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs ⋮ Designing Dynamic Contests ⋮ On the optimal allocation of prizes in best-of-three all-pay auctions ⋮ Contest design and heterogeneity ⋮ Contests with insurance ⋮ Unfair contests ⋮ A game-theoretic analysis of rank-order mechanisms for user-generated content ⋮ A model of a two-stage all-pay auction ⋮ Dynamic contests with resource constraints ⋮ Competitive burnout: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts ⋮ Splitting leagues ⋮ Optimal crowdsourcing contests ⋮ Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information ⋮ Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes ⋮ The optimal multi-stage contest ⋮ Sequential two-prize contests ⋮ College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized ⋮ ``Small, yet beautiful: reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests ⋮ Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums ⋮ Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests ⋮ Discrimination in contests: a survey ⋮ Information in tournaments under limited liability ⋮ The optimal allocation of prizes in two-stage contests ⋮ Winner's optimal reimbursement in contest ⋮ Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players ⋮ Your failure is my opportunity -- effects of elimination in contests ⋮ The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests ⋮ Tournaments with midterm reviews ⋮ Multi-battle contests ⋮ Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests ⋮ Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning ⋮ Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts ⋮ Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry ⋮ Does an increase in the number of solvers benefit the seeker in heterogeneous contests? ⋮ Crowdsourcing contests ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes ⋮ Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities ⋮ The incentive effect of coarsening the competition structure in a tournament ⋮ The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
Cites Work
This page was built for publication: Contest architecture
