Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.016MaRDI QIDQ1753695zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bin Liu, Jingfeng Lu, Ruqu Wang, Jun Zhang

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.016

zbMATH Keywords

leverageincomplete informationmechanism designcross transfernegative prizeoptimal contest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• Contest architecture
• Continuity in auction design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Genericity and robustness of full surplus extraction
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Surplus extraction and competition

Cited in

(16)

• Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes
• Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns
• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities
• Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests
• Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests
• Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
• On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests
• Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
• Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
• Inefficiency of sponsored research
• Prize-linked savings games: theory and experiment
• ENHANCING EFFORT SUPPLY WITH PRIZE‐AUGMENTING ENTRY FEES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
• The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
• Ability grouping in contests
• Correction to: ``Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

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