Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.016zbMATH Open1422.91390OpenAlexW2790777478MaRDI QIDQ1753695FDOQ1753695

Authors: Bin Liu, Jingfeng Lu, Ruqu Wang, Jun Zhang 

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.016

Recommendations

• Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests
• Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests
• Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
• The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
• The optimal allocation of prizes in two-stage contests

zbMATH Keywords

leverageincomplete informationmechanism designcross transfernegative prizeoptimal contest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Contest architecture
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Optimal Auction Design
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests
• Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
• Continuity in auction design
• Genericity and robustness of full surplus extraction
• Surplus extraction and competition

Cited In (16)

• Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns
• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
• Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes
• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities
• Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests
• Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests
• Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
• Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
• On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests
• Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
• Inefficiency of sponsored research
• Prize-linked savings games: theory and experiment
• ENHANCING EFFORT SUPPLY WITH PRIZE‐AUGMENTING ENTRY FEES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
• The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
• Ability grouping in contests
• Correction to: ``Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

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