Recommendations
Cited in
(31)- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
- Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
- Collusion and discrimination in organizations
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Reauditing and dual sourcing? Implication of collusion deterrence measures in ethical sourcing
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
- Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
- Mechanism design with collusive supervision
- Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes
- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
- Optimal collusion with internal contracting
- Secret versus public rings in common value auctions
- Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
- Bidding collusion without passive updating
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Consulting collusive experts
- Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
- Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
- On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers
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