Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
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Publication:3418481
DOI10.7916/D86T0ZVZ 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00694.x; 10.7916/D86T0ZVZzbMath1152.91319MaRDI QIDQ3418481
Publication date: 5 February 2007
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00694.x
hierarchical delegation; subgroup collusion; robustly collusion-proof implementation, pairwise identifiability
91A10: Noncooperative games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44: Economics of information
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