Can labor markets help resolve collusion?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.11.007MaRDI QIDQ1934067zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jeremy Bertomeu

Publication date 28 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

collusionimplementationmarketreplacementtacit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Sustainable collusion on separate markets
• Is capital a collusion device?
• Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Price or quantity in tacit collusion?
• The Economics of Labor Coercion
• Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

Cited in

(2)

• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments

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