Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
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Recommendations
Cited in
(39)- Mechanism design with collusive supervision
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
- Standardization and the stability of collusion
- On the feasibility of maximal collusion
- Collusion properties of values
- Implementing action profiles when agents collude
- A collusion problem and its solution
- When imperfect collution is profitable
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
- Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: The case of Groves mechanisms
- Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
- Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Consulting collusive experts
- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
- Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs
- Optimal collusion with internal contracting
- Combating product label misconduct: the role of traceability and market inspection
- Bidding collusion without passive updating
- Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
- Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
- Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
- Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments
- Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- On the efficiency of hurdle rate-based coordination mechanisms
- Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
- Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
- Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design
- Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
- Vertical relationships with hidden interactions
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
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