Mechanism design with collusive supervision
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Publication:1001815
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.02.006zbMATH Open1154.91529OpenAlexW2105670076MaRDI QIDQ1001815FDOQ1001815
Publication date: 19 February 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.006
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Cites Work
- Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- On countervailing incentives
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
- Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
- Decentralization and collusion
- On some agency costs of intermediated contracting
- Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
- Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
- The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs
Cited In (9)
- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
- Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design
- Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
- Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion
- Decentralization of contracts with interim side-contracting
- On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
- Consulting collusive experts
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