Mechanism design with collusive supervision

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.02.006MaRDI QIDQ1001815zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gorkem Celik

Publication date 19 February 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

collusionmechanism designdelegationsupervision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy
• Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design
• Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion
• On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information

Cites work

• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Decentralization and collusion
• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• On countervailing incentives
• On some agency costs of intermediated contracting
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs
• The organization of supplier networks: effects of delegation and intermediation.

Cited in

(12)

• Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design
• Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy
• Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion
• Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection
• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
• Supervisory information and loss aversion
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• Consulting collusive experts
• Decentralization of contracts with interim side-contracting
• On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies

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