Optimal collusion-proof auctions

DOI10.7916/D832072FMaRDI QIDQ1007321zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim

Publication date 20 March 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

an exclusion principlecollusion on participationmultiple bidding cartelssubgroup collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Controlling collusion in auctions: the role of ceilings and reserve prices
• Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions

Cites work

• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Bidder collusion
• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.

Cited in

(25)

• Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information
• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
• Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
• Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
• Collusion-proof and fair auctions
• Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions
• Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Self-rejecting mechanisms
• Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
• Controlling collusion in auctions: the role of ceilings and reserve prices
• Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions
• Bidding collusion without passive updating
• Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: the role of tie-breaking rules
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Bribing in second-price auctions
• A strongly group strategyproof and shill resistant bargaining mechanism for fog resource pricing
• When imperfect collution is profitable
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
• Consulting collusive experts
• Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions Over Continuous Goods
• Strictly strategy-proof auctions

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