Controlling collusion in auctions: the role of ceilings and reserve prices

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.04.033MaRDI QIDQ1934692zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Prabal Roy Chowdhury

Publication date 29 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.033

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsceilingscollusionreserve prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Collusion via resale
• Bidder collusion

Cites work

• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
• Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers

Cited in

(6)

• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
• Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions
• The vulnerability of auctions to bidder collusion
• Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility

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