Bidder collusion
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2370507
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.004zbMath1280.91085OpenAlexW4244667322MaRDI QIDQ2370507
Leslie M. Marx, Robert C. Marshall
Publication date: 26 June 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.004
Related Items
Bidding rings: a bargaining approach ⋮ Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Private monitoring in auctions ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities ⋮ Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions ⋮ Collusion through communication in auctions ⋮ Clustered bids in first-price auctions: collusion or competition? ⋮ Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism ⋮ Bidder collusion at first-price auctions ⋮ Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values ⋮ Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values ⋮ The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle ⋮ Commitment in first-price auctions ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions ⋮ The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions ⋮ The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders ⋮ Optimal collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement ⋮ Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request ⋮ Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions ⋮ Core deviation minimizing auctions
Cites Work
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
- Auctions with endogenous entry
- Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
