Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
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Publication:5475034
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00513.xzbMath1141.91327OpenAlexW2083788909MaRDI QIDQ5475034
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00513.x
2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Bidder collusion ⋮ A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring ⋮ Sequential payments and optimal pricing in payment systems ⋮ Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments ⋮ Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring ⋮ The analogical foundations of cooperation ⋮ Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence ⋮ The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ Learning a population distribution ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games ⋮ Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty ⋮ Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring ⋮ Folk theorem with communication ⋮ A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games ⋮ Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets ⋮ Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy
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