Instability of belief-free equilibria
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Publication:508403
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.001zbMath1400.91048OpenAlexW3123213776MaRDI QIDQ508403
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75990/2/MPRA_paper_75990.pdf
communicationevolutionary stabilityrepeated prisoner's dilemmabelief-free equilibriumprivate monitoring
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Public goods (91B18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Cites Work
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