The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
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Publication:2475177
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.04.001zbMath1132.91316OpenAlexW2272747856MaRDI QIDQ2475177
Eiichi Miyagawa, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Yasuyuki Miyahara
Publication date: 10 March 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.04.001
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