Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence
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Publication:449187
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.016zbMath1247.91022MaRDI QIDQ449187
Publication date: 12 September 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/12-005.pdf
repeated game; conditional independence; prisoner's dilemma; private monitoring; belief-free review-strategy equilibrium
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
Related Items
The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring, Instability of belief-free equilibria, A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games, The analogical foundations of cooperation
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