Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2853zbMATH Open0996.91015OpenAlexW1978295231MaRDI QIDQ1604516FDOQ1604516

Authors: Michihiro Kandori 

Publication date: 4 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2853

Recommendations

• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
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• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
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• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Commitment and observability in games
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
• Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
• On sustaining cooperation without public observations

Cited In (25)

• Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
• Finitely repeated games with monitoring options
• Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity
• What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
• Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
• Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
• Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
• A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
• Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
• Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
• Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• When (not) to publicize inspection results
• Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence
• Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games
• Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
• A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
• Discontinuous stochastic games
• Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
• Instability of belief-free equilibria
• Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games

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