Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
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Publication:1604516
Recommendations
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Cites work
- A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
- An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
- Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
- Commitment and observability in games
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
- Games with imperfectly observable commitment
- Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
- Moral hazard and private monitoring
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
- On sustaining cooperation without public observations
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
- Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Cited in
(25)- Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
- Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
- Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
- Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
- Finitely repeated games with monitoring options
- A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
- Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
- Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
- Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
- Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
- Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
- Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
- Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity
- The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
- Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring
- Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games
- Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence
- Instability of belief-free equilibria
- What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
- Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
- When (not) to publicize inspection results
- A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
- Discontinuous stochastic games
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