Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2853zbMath0996.91015MaRDI QIDQ1604516

Michihiro Kandori

Publication date: 4 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2853

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

When (not) to publicize inspection results, Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals, Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information, Finitely repeated games with monitoring options, Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting, Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence, Instability of belief-free equilibria, A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring, The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games, Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals, Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring, A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games, Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games, Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games, Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game, A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games, Discontinuous stochastic games, Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity, Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games, What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs

Cites Work

• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• On sustaining cooperation without public observations
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• Commitment and observability in games
• Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies