On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90139-CzbMATH Open0733.90086WikidataQ126297945 ScholiaQ126297945MaRDI QIDQ810388FDOQ810388

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

discountingrepeated games with private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting

Cited In (19)

• Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
• Strategic buyers and privately observed prices
• Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
• When (not) to publicize inspection results
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• The analogical foundations of cooperation
• Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation
• The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games
• Repeated Games with Complete Information
• Foundation of quantum optimal transport and applications
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Instability of belief-free equilibria
• Self-enforcing collusion in large dynamic markets

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