Self-enforcing collusion in large dynamic markets
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Publication:759620
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90145-5zbMath0553.90020OpenAlexW1988741369MaRDI QIDQ759620
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90145-5
noncooperative equilibriumlarge dynamic marketsrepeated Cournot oligopolyrepeated games with discountingself-enforcing collusion
Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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