Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90052-LzbMath0713.90101MaRDI QIDQ750328

Hamid Sabourian

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibrium; \(\epsilon\)-Nash equilibrium; anonymous repeated games; random outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A07: Games with infinitely many players

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Large nonanonymous repeated games, When are nonanonymous players negligible?, Pivotal players and the characterization of influence, Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome, Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium, A strong anti-folk theorem

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