College assignment as a large contest
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1753683
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.006zbMATH Open1422.91547OpenAlexW2312234815MaRDI QIDQ1753683FDOQ1753683
Brent R. Hickman, Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.006
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics With Many Firms
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- Strict monotonicity in comparative statics
- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- Large Robust Games
- On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
- Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
- Infinite Player Noncooperative Games and the Continuity of the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games
- Ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria of large games
- Large Contests
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
- When are nonanonymous players negligible?
- Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem
Cited In (5)
This page was built for publication: College assignment as a large contest
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1753683)
