Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
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Publication:1385275
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2327zbMath0896.90030MaRDI QIDQ1385275
Matthew O. Jackson, Alejandro M. Manelli
Publication date: 14 June 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2327
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism, Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets, Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange, Informational robustness of competitive equilibria., Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms, Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies, The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information, STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
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