Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information

DOI10.2307/2951522MaRDI QIDQ4016182zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Faruk Gul, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date 9 December 1992

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2951522

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic efficiencyincentive compatibilityincomplete informationlarge exchange economiesprivate informationrational expectations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(29)

• Aggregation of expert opinions
• Private information in large economies
• Efficiency and adverse selection
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
• Informational robustness of competitive equilibria.
• Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
• Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
• Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
• Core convergence with asymmetric information
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.
• Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
• Robust efficiency in mixed economies with asymmetric information
• An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies
• Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary
• Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
• Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
• Irrelevance of private information in two-period economies with more goods than states of nature
• Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
• The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
• Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
• Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
• Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
• Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information
• General equilibrium in economies with differential information and uncertain delivery
• Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game

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