Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.11.005zbMATH Open1369.91069OpenAlexW2186550379MaRDI QIDQ899678FDOQ899678
Authors: Tai-Wei Hu, Neil Wallace 
Publication date: 30 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/130641731/cournot_11_3_15_N.pdf
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- Microeconomic theory
- Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets
- A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategles
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
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- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
- The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
- A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium
- Uncertainty Resolution, Private Information Aggregation and the Cournot Competitive Limit
Cited In (4)
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