Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.11.005MaRDI QIDQ899678zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tai-Wei Hu, Neil Wallace

Publication date 30 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/130641731/cournot_11_3_15_N.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyinformation aggregationmechanism designmarket game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Information aggregation in competitive markets
• Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets
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• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3866998 (Why is no real title available?)
• A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium
• A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategles
• Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Microeconomic theory
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
• Uncertainty Resolution, Private Information Aggregation and the Cournot Competitive Limit

Cited in

(6)

• Information aggregation in large collective purchases
• Linear aggregation of information in hierarchical games
• Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets
• Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
• Resilient Information Aggregation
• Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations

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