Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
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Publication:5475027
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00380zbMath1103.91386OpenAlexW4234183920MaRDI QIDQ5475027
Andrew Postlewaite, Richard P. McLean
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00380
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