Dynamic yardstick mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.004zbMath1125.91377OpenAlexW2161885005MaRDI QIDQ2491877

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 29 May 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentRatchet effectcorrelated mechanismsshort- and long-term contractsYardstick regulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

On the dynamic optimality of yardstick regulation

Cites Work

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• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
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• On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement

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