The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design

DOI10.1007/S001990050227zbMath0909.90122OpenAlexW2003117411MaRDI QIDQ1266874

Steven R. Williams, Georgia Kosmopoulou

Publication date: 13 October 1998

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050227

zbMATH Keywords

group decision-makingincentive compatible mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral \(k\)-double auctions ⋮ Dynamic yardstick mechanisms ⋮ Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions ⋮ Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible ⋮ Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values ⋮ Optimal contracts with contingent allocation

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