The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.07.002MaRDI QIDQ536085zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas A. Gresik

Publication date 16 May 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

affiliationdouble auctionsstatistically dependent valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
• Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• Bilateral trading in divisible double auctions
• Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
• Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
• Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
• The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium

Cited in

(1)

• Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games

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