The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral \(k\)-double auctions
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Publication:536085
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.002zbMath1236.91078OpenAlexW3125356108MaRDI QIDQ536085
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.002
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Cites Work
- Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
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- Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1