The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions
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Publication:536085
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.07.002zbMATH Open1236.91078OpenAlexW3125356108MaRDI QIDQ536085FDOQ536085
Authors: Thomas A. Gresik 
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.002
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Cites Work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
- Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
- Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
Cited In (1)
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