Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.004zbMath1186.91109OpenAlexW3122787642MaRDI QIDQ996390

Ohad Kadan

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionaffiliationprivate valuesincreasing strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor ⋮ Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games ⋮ Reprint of: ``Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral \(k\)-double auctions ⋮ Price discovery using a double auction

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