Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
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Publication:2641210
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90149-XzbMath0721.90029MaRDI QIDQ2641210
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90149-x
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values, Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade, Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values, Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction, The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions
Cites Work
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