Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90149-XMaRDI QIDQ2641210zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas A. Gresik

Publication date 1991

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90149-x

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral tradedependent beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• Subjective Beliefs and ex ante Trade
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information
• On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Cited in

(7)

• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Robust bilateral trade with discrete types
• The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions
• Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
• Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values

This page was built for publication: Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2641210)