Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.08.003MaRDI QIDQ502369zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marc Schröder, Dries Vermeulen, János Flesch

Publication date 5 January 2017

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/72810614/flesch_2016_implementable_and_ex_post_IR.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining probleminterim-implementable trading rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488111 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
• On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Optimal Auction Design
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Robust trading mechanisms

Cited in

(2)

• Collusion-proof and fair auctions
• Robust bilateral trade with discrete types

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