Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.08.003zbMATH Open1397.91257OpenAlexW2518700550MaRDI QIDQ502369FDOQ502369

Authors: Marc Schröder, Dries Vermeulen, János Flesch 

Publication date: 5 January 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/72810614/flesch_2016_implementable_and_ex_post_IR.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

bargaining probleminterim-implementable trading rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Robust trading mechanisms
• Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
• On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

Cited In (2)

• Collusion-proof and fair auctions
• Robust bilateral trade with discrete types

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