On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0540-3zbMath1233.91128OpenAlexW3122438853MaRDI QIDQ639892

Nozomu Muto, Stefano Galavotti, Daisuke Oyama

Publication date: 11 October 2011

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0540-3

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designefficient tradeex post individual rationalityGroves mechanisminterdependent valuation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (8)

Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments ⋮ A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values ⋮ Partnership dissolution and proprietary information ⋮ Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values

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