Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0154-XzbMATH Open1302.91188OpenAlexW3124015626MaRDI QIDQ483585FDOQ483585
Authors: Ludwig Ensthaler, Thomas Giebe, Jianpei Li 
Publication date: 17 December 2014
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0154-x
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Cites Work
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
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- Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
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- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
- Asymmetric partnerships
- Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control
- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: an experimental study
- Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
- Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
- A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
- A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- Sequential bargaining with common values
Cited In (2)
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