Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
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Cites work
- A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Asymmetric partnerships
- Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
- Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
- Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
- Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Sequential bargaining with common values
- Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: an experimental study
Cited in
(9)- On the dissolution of three-party partnerships via a buy-sell mechanism
- Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: an experimental study
- Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- Dissolving a partnership securely
- Dissolving a partnership dynamically
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- Partnership dissolution: information and efficiency
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
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