Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2384439
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.004zbMath1144.91339MaRDI QIDQ2384439
John L. Turner, Emanuel Ornelas
Publication date: 21 September 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.18934.1075409584.pdf
91B60: Trade models
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
90B70: Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research
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When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships, Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions, Merger negotiations and ex-post regret, Partnership dissolution and proprietary information, Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently