Recommendations
Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- An Efficient Auction
- Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
Cited in
(27)- Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control
- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
- Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
- Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
- Ex post implementation
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- Competitive bargaining equilibrium
- Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
- Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion
- Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments
- Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
- A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
- Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- Bargaining over bets
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
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