Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
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Publication:2675402
Abstract: We study bilateral trade with interdependent values as an informed-principal problem. The mechanism-selection game has multiple equilibria that differ with respect to principal's payoff and trading surplus. We characterize the equilibrium that is worst for every type of principal, and characterize the conditions under which there are no equilibria with different payoffs for the principal. We also show that this is the unique equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion.
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Cited in
(7)- A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
- Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
- Selling with evidence
- Strategically simple implementation in the bilateral trade problem
- An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
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