The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
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Cited in
(78)- Informed principal and information gathering agent
- Value of communication in agencies
- Posterior-preserving information improvements and principal-agent relationships
- Stock-returns and inflation in a principal-agent economy
- Starting small and renegotiation
- Competition between asymmetrically informed principals
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Credit market imperfections and the separation of ownership from control
- Principals and agents: does the assignment of information matter?
- On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
- Matching markets with adverse selection
- (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
- Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information
- The use of an agent in a signalling model
- Higher order lags in price-adjusting oligopoly
- Contractual signaling in a market environment
- Two-person bargaining with verifiable information
- On the role of commitment in a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal
- Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase theorem revisited
- Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller
- Informed principal and countervailing incentives
- Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
- Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
- On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets
- The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
- Experimental design to persuade
- A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
- Information transmission in coalitional voting games
- Return distributions of strategic growth options
- On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- Informed principal with correlation
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat
- A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types
- Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- A game of settlements in public contracts
- Principal and expert agent
- Using Trembling-Hand Perfection to Alleviate the Interlinked Principal-Agent Problem
- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent
- On economic efficiency under non-convexity
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
- Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition
- Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
- Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
- Principal-agent models
- On selecting the right agent
- Selling with evidence
- The strategically ignorant principal
- Interim third-party selection in bargaining
- Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem
- A game theoretic foundation of competitive equilibria with adverse selection
- Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
- Bargaining power in crisis bargaining
- When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
- Technical Note—Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
- Overconfidence and moral hazard
- The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
- Information exchange through secret vertical contracts
- Certification design with common values
- Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information
- Starting small and commitment
- Verifiable disclosure
- Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
- Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
- An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
- Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
- Reserve price signaling
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