Selling with evidence

DOI10.3982/TE2885MaRDI QIDQ5225078zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta

Publication date 19 July 2019

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2885

zbMATH Keywords

certificationconsumer heterogeneityinformed principalinterdependent valuationsmechanism designproduct information disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
• Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
• Auction and the informed seller problem
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• Selling Procedures with Private Information and Common Values

Cites work

• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
• An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Disclosures and Asset Returns
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3307201 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implicit Functions and Solution Mappings
• Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
• Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Lower semicontinuity of the feasible set mapping of linear systems relative to their domains
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Optimal Auction Design
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Strategic Information Revelation
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Two-person bargaining with verifiable information

Cited in

(11)

• Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller
• Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits
• Auction and the informed seller problem
• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
• Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
• Direct and Indirect Sale of Information
• Selling Procedures with Private Information and Common Values
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• How to sell hard information
• Pre-sale information
• Buyer-optimal extensionproof information

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