Strategic Information Revelation
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Publication:3483115
Recommendations
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic information exchange
- Strategic information transmission despite conflict
- Information and strategic behavior
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
- On the value of information in a strategic conflict
- Strategic information transmission networks
- Strategic disclosure of feasible options
Cited in
(57)- Coordination and private information revelation
- Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification
- Do you want to know a secret? Strategic alliances and competition in product markets
- Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers
- Decisions between incompletely informed agents: a basic rating game
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Unraveling in first-price auction.
- Communication in Cournot oligopoly
- Selling with evidence
- Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation.
- Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
- Long persuasion games
- Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
- Communication with evidence in the lab
- Coalition-proof information exchanges
- A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information
- Strategic disclosure of feasible options
- Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
- Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
- False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
- Decisions between incompletely informed agents
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion
- Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
- Information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings: complete revelation in dynamic analysis
- Implementation with partial provability
- Information revelation in auctions
- Bond pricing under imprecise information
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- The value of information in oligopoly with demand uncertainty
- Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies
- Informed trading and the `leakage' of information
- The insider's curse
- A model of efficient discovery
- RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
- Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
- Public information quality with monopolistic sellers
- Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
- The study of the strategic consequences of a scoring model disclosure
- Revealing private information in bargaining
- On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
- On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
- Experimental design to persuade
- Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Mixed up? That's good for motivation
- Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
- Test design under voluntary participation
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