Strategic Information Revelation
DOI10.2307/2297541zbMATH Open0703.90103OpenAlexW1972933860MaRDI QIDQ3483115FDOQ3483115
Authors: Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Andrew Postlewaite, Kotaro Suzumura 
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297541
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information revelationsellerBayes-Nash equilibriumbuyerasymmetric information gameoligopolistsnonpublic information
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)
Cited In (56)
- Do you want to know a secret? Strategic alliances and competition in product markets
- Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies
- The study of the strategic consequences of a scoring model disclosure
- Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis
- Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification
- Decisions between incompletely informed agents: a basic rating game
- Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Unraveling in first-price auction.
- Communication in Cournot oligopoly
- Selling with evidence
- Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation.
- Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
- Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
- Long persuasion games
- How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- Communication with evidence in the lab
- Coalition-proof information exchanges
- Strategic disclosure of feasible options
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information
- Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma
- Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
- Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
- Decisions between incompletely informed agents
- False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion
- Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
- Information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings: complete revelation in dynamic analysis
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Bond pricing under imprecise information
- Implementation with partial provability
- Information revelation in auctions
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- The value of information in oligopoly with demand uncertainty
- Informed trading and the `leakage' of information
- The insider's curse
- A model of efficient discovery
- RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
- Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
- Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
- Revealing private information in bargaining
- On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
- On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
- Experimental design to persuade
- Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Mixed up? That's good for motivation
- Test design under voluntary participation
- Coordination and private information revelation
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