The insider's curse
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Publication:632956
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.05.007zbMATH Open1208.91052OpenAlexW1548393456MaRDI QIDQ632956FDOQ632956
Authors: Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Michael Troege
Publication date: 28 March 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.007
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Strategic Information Revelation
- Information revelation in auctions
- The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
- The value of information for auctioneers
- Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions
Cited In (7)
- The good, the bad, the well-connected
- Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
- Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
- The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
- Risky procurement with an insider bidder
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