Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- Information revelation in auctions
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions
- Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
- Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
- Strategic Information Revelation
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
- The value of information for auctioneers
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
Cited in
(7)- The good, the bad, the well-connected
- Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
- Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
- The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
- Risky procurement with an insider bidder
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