The value of information for auctioneers
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Publication:840693
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.04.002zbMath1195.91056MaRDI QIDQ840693
Publication date: 14 September 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.04.002
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders, Information acquisition and full surplus extraction, The insider's curse, Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
Cites Work
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