The value of information for auctioneers
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Publication:840693
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Comparing location experiments
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Game theory
- Ignorance in agency problems
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Microeconomic theory
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Optimal search auctions
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
Cited in
(9)- Ex Post Information in Auctions
- Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
- Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue
- The insider's curse
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Information concentration in common value environments
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
- The value of information concealment
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