The value of information for auctioneers

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.04.002zbMATH Open1195.91056OpenAlexW2009612355MaRDI QIDQ840693FDOQ840693

Authors: M. Hagedorn 

Publication date: 14 September 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.04.002

Recommendations

• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcommon valuesendogenous informationasymmetric information structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Game theory
• Microeconomic theory
• Comparing location experiments
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Auctions with costly information acquisition
• Optimal search auctions
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Ignorance in agency problems
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem

Cited In (9)

• Ex Post Information in Auctions
• Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
• Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue
• The insider's curse
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Information concentration in common value environments
• Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
• The value of information concealment

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