Information structures in optimal auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001zbMath1132.91441MaRDI QIDQ2469860

Publication date: 11 February 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d13/d1323.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

partitions; information; private values; optimal auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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