Information structures in optimal auctions
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Publication:2469860
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.02.001zbMATH Open1132.91441OpenAlexW3125627556MaRDI QIDQ2469860FDOQ2469860
Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Martin Pesendorfer 
Publication date: 11 February 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d13/d1323.pdf
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Cited In (74)
- Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- Information design in optimal auctions
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Communication and efficiency in auctions
- Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
- Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty
- Information elicitation for Bayesian auctions
- Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
- Characterizing social value of information
- Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Informational control and organizational design
- The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
- First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
- The value of information for auctioneers
- Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion.
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
- Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- Competitive contracts with productive information gathering
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure
- On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers
- The insider's curse
- Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
- Monopolistic signal provision
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Sequential information disclosure in auctions
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: the case of treasury auctions
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- Information control in reputational cheap talk
- The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
- Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
- Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
- Experimental design to persuade
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Information revelation in competitive markets
- Optimality and Efficiency in Auctions Design: A Survey
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?
- Test design under voluntary participation
- Monotone persuasion
- Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
- A Manipulation Game Based on Machiavellian Strategies
- Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition
- Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
- Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
- Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
- Information Disclosure and Pricing Policies for Sales of Network Goods
- Nonlinear pricing with finite information
- A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller
- Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies
- Perfect robust implementation by private information design
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
- Shuttle diplomacy
- Auctions
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