Recommendations
Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3174984 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5178094 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6846220 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238721 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction
Cited in
(79)- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- Competitive contracts with productive information gathering
- Information elicitation for Bayesian auctions
- Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
- On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers
- Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: the case of treasury auctions
- Information control in reputational cheap talk
- On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure
- Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
- Information revelation in competitive markets
- The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
- Test design under voluntary participation
- Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
- Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition
- Experimental design to persuade
- Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
- Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller
- Nonlinear pricing with finite information
- Monotone persuasion
- Monopolistic signal provision
- Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Information disclosure and pricing policies for sales of network goods
- Optimality and Efficiency in Auctions Design: A Survey
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
- Communication and efficiency in auctions
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
- Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
- A manipulation game based on Machiavellian strategies
- Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
- Auctions
- Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?
- Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
- Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty
- Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
- Information design in optimal auctions
- Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
- Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition
- Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
- Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
- Shuttle diplomacy
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
- Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
- The insider's curse
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
- Perfect robust implementation by private information design
- Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
- Information design in allocation with costly verification
- Optimal discriminatory disclosure
- Discrete single-parameter optimal auction design
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
- The value of information for auctioneers
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- Characterizing social value of information
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Sequential information disclosure in auctions
- Informational control and organizational design
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