Information structures in optimal auctions
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Publication:2469860
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001zbMath1132.91441OpenAlexW3125627556MaRDI QIDQ2469860
Dirk Bergemann, Martin Pesendorfer
Publication date: 11 February 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d13/d1323.pdf
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- The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
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