Information structures in optimal auctions
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Publication:2469860
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3174984 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5178094 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6846220 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238721 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction
Cited in
(76)- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
- Monopolistic signal provision
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Information design in optimal auctions
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Test design under voluntary participation
- Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Informational control and organizational design
- Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
- Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
- Communication and efficiency in auctions
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
- Sequential information disclosure in auctions
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
- Information elicitation for Bayesian auctions
- The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
- Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- Information revelation in competitive markets
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
- Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
- Competitive contracts with productive information gathering
- Information control in reputational cheap talk
- First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
- Characterizing social value of information
- Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: the case of treasury auctions
- The value of information for auctioneers
- Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
- Optimality and Efficiency in Auctions Design: A Survey
- Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure
- Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
- On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers
- Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
- Experimental design to persuade
- The insider's curse
- Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Information disclosure and pricing policies for sales of network goods
- Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition
- Perfect robust implementation by private information design
- Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition
- A manipulation game based on Machiavellian strategies
- Monotone persuasion
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller
- Nonlinear pricing with finite information
- Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
- Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
- Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition
- Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
- Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences
- Shuttle diplomacy
- Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies
- Auctions
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