Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2004.00305.xzbMath1095.91012OpenAlexW3124375337MaRDI QIDQ4664530

Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date: 5 April 2005

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2004.00305.x

zbMATH Keywords

auction models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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