Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
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Publication:4664530
DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2004.00305.XzbMATH Open1095.91012OpenAlexW3124375337MaRDI QIDQ4664530FDOQ4664530
Authors: Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite 
Publication date: 5 April 2005
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2004.00305.x
Recommendations
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
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- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
Cited In (26)
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- Information design in optimal auctions
- Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
- Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
- Efficient incentives with social preferences
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
- Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
- Dynamic yardstick mechanisms
- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- Interpreted and generated signals
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
- A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
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